Proportional Committee Elections with Positive and Negative Votes
A new research paper on arXiv (2503.01985) explores proportionality in committee elections where voters can both approve and disapprove candidates. The study, announced as a replace-cross, proposes two interpretations of negative votes: one where preventing disapproved candidates is as important as electing approved ones, and another where approvals and disapprovals are treated separately with distinct fairness guarantees. For each approach, the authors introduce axioms for proportionality and examine their satisfiability using variants of Phragmén's rule. This work extends classic committee election settings to more expressive voting scenarios common on online polling platforms.
Key facts
- The paper is available on arXiv with identifier 2503.01985.
- The announcement type is replace-cross.
- The research addresses committee elections with both positive and negative votes.
- Two interpretations of negative votes are proposed.
- The first interpretation treats preventing disapproved candidates as equally important as electing approved ones.
- The second interpretation treats approvals and disapprovals separately with individual fairness guarantees.
- Suitable axioms for proportionality are introduced for each approach.
- The satisfiability of these axioms is examined using variants of Phragmén's rule.
Entities
Institutions
- arXiv