New Solution Concept for Coalitional Stability in Game Theory
A new research paper on arXiv proposes an alternative solution concept for game theory that minimizes coalitional deviation incentives, guaranteeing existence unlike traditional concepts such as strong Nash equilibrium. The study focuses on minimizing the average gain of a deviating coalition and extends to weighted-average and maximum-within-coalition gains, while proving the minimum-gain analogue is computationally intractable. Lower bounds are established for the average-gain and maximum-gain objectives.
Key facts
- arXiv:2604.28186v1
- Announce Type: cross
- Abstract: Computing Equilibrium beyond Unilateral Deviation
- Traditional concepts like Nash and correlated equilibrium only prevent unilateral deviations
- Strong Nash and coalition-proof equilibrium often fail to exist
- New concept minimizes coalitional deviation incentives
- Focuses on minimizing average gain of a deviating coalition
- Extended to weighted-average and maximum-within-coalition gains
- Minimum-gain analogue is computationally intractable
- Lower bound proven for average-gain and maximum-gain objectives
Entities
Institutions
- arXiv