Impedance-Based Framework Quantifies Cyber-Vulnerability in Power Electronics
A new framework quantifies cyber-vulnerability in power electronics systems. Researchers propose an impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain (ARD) that maps adversarial actions to critical-eigenvalue migration through impedance reshaping. An Attack Penetration Index defines node-level vulnerability by characterizing nominal stability margin penetration and accessibility of destabilizing attacks within a privilege-constrained action space. A gray-box workflow integrates existing impedance identification when inverter models are unavailable. The work addresses the lack of an attacker-oriented metric for power electronics systems with digital controllers and communication networks. The paper appears on arXiv (2605.14502).
Key facts
- Proposes impedance-based Attack Reachable Domain (ARD) framework.
- Defines Attack Penetration Index for node-level cyber-vulnerability.
- Addresses privilege-constrained action space for attackers.
- Integrates gray-box workflow for when inverter models are unavailable.
- Focuses on power electronics systems with digital controllers.
- Published on arXiv with ID 2605.14502.
- Maps adversarial actions to critical-eigenvalue migration.
- Characterizes nominal stability margin penetration.
Entities
Institutions
- arXiv