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Constitutional Governance in Metric Spaces: A Polynomial-Time Process

other · 2026-05-14

A recent paper published on arXiv introduces a polynomial-time methodology for constitutional governance within metric spaces, merging aggregation, deliberation, amendment, and consensus into one cohesive framework. The constitution outlines a specific metric space, an aggregation rule, and a supermajority requirement for each amendable aspect. Members cast votes and submit personal proposals as ideal elements. Any member can propose a public initiative, provided it garners supermajority support through coalition discussions, optimization, or AI mediation. The constitutional framework evaluates proposals against the existing status quo, adopting the one with the highest positive score or maintaining the current state. This approach overcomes previous research challenges where essential metric-space aggregators were NP-hard and stages were considered separately.

Key facts

  • Paper arXiv:2605.13362 proposes constitutional governance in metric spaces.
  • It integrates aggregation, deliberation, amendment, and consensus into one polynomial-time process.
  • The constitution assigns a metric space, aggregation rule, and supermajority threshold per amendable component.
  • Each member submits an ideal element as both vote and personal proposal.
  • Any member may submit a public proposal with supermajority public support.
  • Public proposals can be sourced from coalition deliberation, optimization, or AI mediation.
  • The constitutional rule scores proposals against the status quo.
  • It adopts the supported proposal with positive maximal score or retains the status quo.

Entities

Institutions

  • arXiv

Sources