Computing Thiele Rules on Interval Elections
A new paper on arXiv (2605.03067) resolves the computational complexity of Thiele rules, including Proportional Approval Voting (PAV), on the voter interval (VI) domain. While Thiele rules are NP-hard in general, they are polynomial-time solvable on the candidate interval (CI) domain via a linear program (LP) with a totally unimodular constraint matrix. The VI domain was an open problem; the authors show that although the LP matrix is not totally unimodular, at least one optimal solution exists, settling the complexity question. Thiele rules are valued for proportional representation, Pareto optimality, and support monotonicity.
Key facts
- Thiele rules include Proportional Approval Voting (PAV).
- Computing Thiele outcomes is NP-hard in general.
- On candidate interval (CI) domain, Thiele rules are polynomial-time solvable via LP.
- The LP for CI domain has a totally unimodular constraint matrix.
- Voter interval (VI) domain complexity was an open question.
- The paper shows the LP for VI domain is not totally unimodular but has an optimal solution.
- Thiele rules satisfy proportional representation, Pareto optimality, and support monotonicity.
- The paper is on arXiv with ID 2605.03067.
Entities
Institutions
- arXiv